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Abstract
This paper investigates the economic consequences of international migration from
the point of view of destination countries. Consistently with international evidence on
migration flows, we build a model where the migration rate is higher among the highly-
educated. A negative relationship is shown to exist between the domestic wage level
and the percentage of educated workers among immigrants, which raises interesting
policy implications. In particular, the optimal immigration policy from the point
of view of natives requires an immigration quota above a certain minimum level.
Extending the analysis to a dynamic setting, we highlight additional eﬀects of the
immigration quota on human capital accumulation among natives.
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1 Introduction
Recent evidence on the composition of international migration flows shows that inter-
national mobility of workers is especially important at high and very high educational
levels and confirms the existence of a substantial transfer of human capital from less de-
veloped to industrialized countries, the so-called “brain drain”. For instance, Carrington
and Detragiache [6] provide estimates of the ratio of migrants to the US and other OECD
countries to total population in sending countries by education achievement and find that
“individuals with little or no education have little access to international migration, and
migrants tend to be much better educated than the rest of the population of their country
of origin. The very well educated tend to be the most internationally mobile group, and
for the large majority of the countries in our sample (e)migration rates are the highest for
this educational category” (pag.6).
In the light of this evidence, the causes and consequences of the brain drain from the
point of view of sending countries have received renewed attention. Recent work in this
area (see for example Beine et al. [2]) tends to attribute a beneficial eﬀect to moderate
brain drain and to policy interventions in the direction of labor flows liberalization, as the
prospect of working abroad may increase the expected return of investment in education
and foster human capital accumulation in source countries.
On the contrary, formal investigations of the eﬀects of migration in destination coun-
tries typically do not incorporate in the analysis the fact that emigration rates are highest
among the most educated.1
In the study of the determinants of the average quality of immigrants in receiving
countries, an authoritative hypothesis is that of Borjas [5] who argues that a “negative
selection” of immigrants, that is a situation where the individuals with the higher incentive
to migrate to a particular country tend to be those with below-average skills levels in their
home countries, may set in as the major sources of immigration shift from rich and rela-
tively equalitarian countries to poor and unequal countries. This occurs as the education
1Boeri e alia [3] bring together a large empirical literature on the assessment of the eﬀects of immigration
in major destination countries.
1
(skill) premium is typically higher in relatively poorer and more unequal countries.
This argument has been used, for example, to explain the decline in the average quality
of immigrants into the US in the postwar period, as well as the lower average quality of
immigrants into the US relative to Canada.2 However, this view of the immigration process
has recently been challenged by Chiquiar and Hanson [7], who observe that Mexican
immigrants to the US, though less educated on average than US natives, tend to have
above-average education relative to Mexican residents, and thus are positively selected in
their home countries.3 The proposed explanation for this finding is that the less-educated
bear relatively higher direct migration costs that may outweigh the skill premium eﬀect.
Also Chiswick [8], in his analysis of migrants selection, shows that the presence of direct
costs of migration non-proportional to wages tends to generate favorable selection.
The main goal of this paper is therefore to develop a model of international migration
which is consistent with evidence on emigration rates. Following the above discussion, our
starting point will be the incorporation of diﬀerential migration costs in a simple model
of international migration driven by economic incentives. Within this framework, we will
study the endogenous determination of the composition of immigrants inflow as a result
of the conditions prevailing on the domestic labor market and provide policy implications
regarding the optimal level of the immigration quota.
By studying the immigration process in a general equilibrium context, our analysis
provides some insights on the potential eﬀects of immigration policy which have not yet
been emphasized by the literature. We will show that the percentage of highly-educated
immigrants may be increasing with the total number of immigrants, thus highlighting a
2The diﬀerent experiences of the US and Canada is sometimes attributed to diﬀerences in the immigra-
tion policy in the two countries, as the US immigration policy tends to favor relatives of US citizens, while
the Canadian point-system favors relatively young and highly-skilled individuals. However, evidence on
this point suggests that this is not the most important factor. In a recent contribution Trejo [11] confirms
previous findings by Borjas [4] and argues that “the comparatively low overall skill level of US immigrants
may have more to do with geographic and historical ties with Mexico” (and Latin America) “than with
the fact that skilled-based admissions are less important in the US than in... Canada”.
3Note that, as discussed by Chiquiar and Hanson [7], Mexico is an ideal candidate to test the validity
of Borjas’ hypothesis, as returns to education and wage dispersion are high relative to the US.
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novel reason why reducing rather than increasing restrictions on labor flows (e.g. increas-
ing the immigration quota) may be beneficial also from the point of view of destination
countries.
More specifically, we will consider an economy where a single good is produced by
means of an immobile factor (land) and an internationally mobile factor (labor). Unskilled
and skilled foreign workers decide whether to apply for entry, taking into account migration
costs, the wage gap, and the probability of finding a job reflecting their skills in the host
economy. The immigration policy places a cap on the number of foreign workers who are
allowed to enter (immigration quota) and is otherwise non-selective.4
If the skilled face a positive probability of being hired as unskilled, a negative selec-
tion bias may emerge as the expected return from migration is relatively higher for the
unskilled. This eﬀect is possibly outweighed by the presence of higher direct migration
costs for the unskilled.
Coherently with the stylized facts discussed above, we will concentrate on the case
where the latter eﬀect prevails so that the emigration rate is higher for the skilled, given the
wage gap. This case has interesting consequences, as it determines a negative relationship
between the percentage of skilled workers among immigrants and the domestic wage level.
In turn, this implies that a low immigration quota (which avoids a sharp decrease in the
domestic wage rate) has adverse eﬀects on the number of skilled immigrants entering the
economy and consequently on natives’ welfare.
As the contribution of human capital to economic growth is fully recognized in the
light of new growth theories, our model of immigration has also long-run implications.
Extending the one-period model to an overlapping generations dynamic model, we can
derive some interesting results. In particular, we will show that, if the immigration of
highly-educated workers generates positive spillovers on natives’ incentives to invest in
education, there exists a threshold level of the immigration quota such that, for any quota
4Our assumptions are meant to keep the analysis as general as possible, avoiding reference to specific
selectivity aspects of immigration policies implemented by single destination countries, and to focus the
attention on economic incentives for legal migration, ruling family reunification, humanitarian reasons, and
illegal migration.
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below this threshold, the steady-state with immigration is characterized by a lower fraction
of skilled natives than in the closed economy. This may bring about adverse eﬀects on the
welfare of natives.
Concerning the dynamic implications of the model, a related contribution is that of
Zak, Feng and Kugler [12] who study the impact of immigration on the dynamics of the
distribution of human capital in the host economy when fertility and migration decisions
are endogenous. As in our model, the overall eﬀect of immigration depends on its impact
on human capital accumulation. The underlying mechanism is diﬀerent from ours, how-
ever, and goes through the influence of immigration on the average fertility rate. Other
contributions extend the neoclassical growth model to encompass international migra-
tion (see for instance chapter 9 in Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1] and references therein).
Lundborg and Segerstrom [10] study the eﬀects of immigration quotas in the context of a
North-South quality ladders growth model, where immigration may have positive growth
eﬀects. However, none of these contributions investigates the endogenous determination
of the average quality of immigrants and its relation with the immigration quota.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the static model,
characterizes the equilibrium with immigration, and discusses policy implications. Section
3 considers a dynamic extension of the model. Section 4 concludes.
2 The one-period model
Consider an economy populated by N agents (households) where a fraction π of agents is
educated while a fraction 1− πwork is not.
Labor supply is inelastic and is higher in eﬃciency units for educated (skilled) agents
than for uneducated (unskilled) agents. A non reproducible immobile factor available
in fixed quantity (land) is used together with labor in the production of the final good.
Land property is equally distributed among all households. The final good and the labor
markets are competitive.
In the final good sector, the non durable consumption good (Y ) is produced using land
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(T ) and labor (L), according to the following aggregate production function:
Y = T ηL1−η (1)
where T is the total supply of land. The total amount of labor in eﬃciency units L is
given by the sum of labor supply from skilled workers Ls and unskilled workers Lu, that
is:
L = Ls + Lu = εsπN + εu(1− π)N (2)
where εs and εu denote the fixed productivity of the skilled and the unskilled respectively,
with εs > εu.
Aggregate supply of production factors (skilled labor, unskilled labor and land) is ex-
ogenously given. Aggregate demand reflects first order conditions for profit maximization
and equilibrium factor prices are determined by:
wu = (1− η)(T/L)ηεu =W (L)εu (3)
ws = (1− η)(T/L)ηεs =W (L)εs (4)
p = η(T/L)η−1 (5)
where wu, ws and p represent the hourly wage for the unskilled and for the skilled and the
(rental) price of land respectively and W is the wage per eﬃciency unit of labor.5
2.1 Labor mobility
We now consider the possibility of international labor mobility and study its eﬀects on
aggregate income and natives’ welfare.
In the international labor market there exists a very large (possibly infinite) number of
workers. A fraction π∗ of these workers is educated (skilled) and has productivity equal to
5The existence of a fixed productivity gap between the skilled and the unskilled and the possibility
of substituting one type of worker for the other in production implies that the skill premium εs/εu is
independent of factor quantities. This feature of the model, which greatly simplifies the analysis, can
be justified in a model of migration. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that immigration has a limited
impact on the skill premium. Instead, it seems to extert a downward pressure on the (low-skilled) wage.
For the US case, see evidence surveyed by Hanson et alia [9].
5
εs∗ and a fraction (1−π∗) is uneducated (unskilled) and has productivity equal to εu∗. We
will denote with ws∗ and wu∗ the (exogenously given) international skilled and unskilled
hourly wage, respectively. Notice that our formulation can encompass situations where
the international skill premium εs∗/εu∗ is higher or lower than the domestic skill premium
εs/εu.
The immigration policy places a (enforceable) cap Q on the number of workers who
are allowed to enter the country in each period. No restriction is placed on the quality of
immigrants. The actual number of immigrants will be denoted with M .
Migration is costly. First, agents have a subjective cost of migration θ ∈ [0, θ], inde-
pendent of their skills. We will assume that θ is uniformly distributed and denote with
G(θ) = θ/θ the cumulative distribution function. For each θ, there exist a very large
(possibly infinite) number of agents whose subjective cost is equal to θ. Second, migration
entails a fixed pecuniary cost which is higher for uneducated agents than for the educated.
We denote these costs with Pu and P s respectively, with Pu > P s.
Finally, due to transaction costs in the labor market of the receiving country, a fraction
z of the educated immigrants is hired as unskilled workers. In this case their productivity
reduces to εu∗.6 Uneducated agents are always hired as unskilled workers. Thus, our
model entails a self-selection bias against skilled workers since the positive probability of
being hired as unskilled decreases their expected wage in the host country. Notice that this
eﬀect is possibly outweighed by the presence of higher migration costs for the unskilled.
Agents are risk-neutral and decide whether to apply for entry by comparing their total
cost of migration with the expected diﬀerence between the labor income they can earn
abroad and at home.
6We could think that, with probability z, the education attainment of educated immigrants is not
recognized by firms who hire them in the destination country, who thus pay them the unskilled foreign
workers’ hourly wage εu∗W . As higher productivity is not remunerated, educated agents provide lower
eﬀort and reduce their productivity in this case.The probability z may reflect institutional features of the
domestic labor market as well as the existence of specific integration policies for immigrants.
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2.2 The equilibrium with immigration
As before, each agent earns a wage which is equal toW times her own productivity. So, for
instance, a skilled worker employed in the domestic economy has a wage equal toW (L)εs∗
where L now includes domestic and foreign labor supply.
Skilled agents will be willing to migrate if and only if their subjective cost is lower
than θs, where:
θs = zWεu∗ + (1− z)Wεs∗ −ws∗ − P s (6)
Similarly, unskilled agents will be willing to migrate if and only if their subjective cost is
lower than θu, where:
θu =Wεu∗ − wu∗ − Pu (7)
Assuming that M is suﬃciently large, the percentage of skilled agents in the total
migrants’ inflow is equal to the probability that an agent who is willing to migrate is
skilled. We will denote this percentage with eπ∗ and write:
eπ∗ = π∗G(θs)
(1− π∗)G(θu) + π∗G(θs) (8)
Clearly, the percentage of unskilled agents in the total migrants’ inflow is equal to 1− eπ∗.
2.2.1 The labor supply with immigration
In order to characterize the competitive equilibrium with migration, we need to study the
behavior of labor supply when immigrants are allowed to enter the domestic labor market.
This will require some additional definitions.
First of all, let us define a threshold value of the unit wage W below which no skilled
agent is willing to migrate. This threshold value is the one that makes foreign skilled
agents with the lowest subjective cost of migration just indiﬀerent between migrating or
not and is given by:
W 0s ≡
ws∗ + P s
zεu∗ + (1− z)εs∗ (9)
7
Similarly, a threshold value can be defined for the unskilled, that is:
W 0u ≡
wu∗ + Pu
εu∗
(10)
Second, we can define a threshold value such that all the skilled are willing to migrate.
This value is given by:
W 00s ≡
θ +ws∗ + P s
zεu∗ + (1− z)εs∗ (11)
Similarly, for the unskilled, we have:
W 00u ≡
θ + wu∗ + Pu
εu∗
(12)
Following the stylized facts that we have discussed in the Introduction, we will focus
on the case where W 0u > W 0s which implies θs > θu
zεu∗+(1−z)εs∗
εu∗ so that the migration rate
is higher among skilled agents than among the unskilled.7.
We are now ready to characterize the labor supply locus and prove the following result:
Proposition 1 Labor supply decreases with W for W ∈ (W 0u,W 00u ) and is inelastic else-
where.
Proof. For W ∈ [0,W 0s) no foreign worker is willing to migrate so that labor supply
is inelastically equal to domestic supply L = [εsπ + εu(1− π)]N . For W ∈ [W 0s,W 0u], only
skilled workers migrate so that eπ∗ = 1 and L = εsπN+εu(1−π)N + [zεu∗ + (1− z)εs∗]Q,
which again does not depend on W . For W ∈ (W 0u,W 00u ),both skilled and unskilled im-
migrants enter the domestic economy. In this case, eπ∗ ∈ (π∗, 1) and L = [εsπ + εu(1 −
π)]N + [eπ∗(1− z)εs∗ + eπ∗zεu∗ + (1− eπ∗)εu∗]Q. As eπ∗ depends on W, the sign of dL
dW
is
determined by the sign of G0(θs) dθ
s
dWG(θ
u)−G0(θu)dθudWG(θ
s), which in turn depends on the
sign of [zεu∗ + (1− z)εs∗]θu− εu∗θs. As W 0u > W 0s, this expression is negative. Finally, for
W > W 00u , all foreign workers are willing to migrate. The proportion between skilled and
7If W 0u < W 0s, at least for some W we have θs < θu so that the migration rate is higher
for the unskilled.
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unskilled immigrants is exogenously given by π∗ and 1−π∗ and labor supply is inelastically
equal to L = [εsπ + εu(1− π)]N + [π∗(1− z)εs∗ + π∗zεu∗ + (1− π∗)εu∗]Q.
Figure 1 illustrates the labor supply locus, where L = [εsπ + εu(1 − π)]N and L∗ =
[eπ∗(1− z)εs∗ + eπ∗zεu∗ + (1− eπ∗)εu∗]Q denote the national and foreign component of la-
bor supply respectively.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
The intuition for the non-standard shape of labor supply is the following. At high
levels of the wage, all foreign agents are willing to migrate and the proportion of skilled
immigrants is exogenously given by π∗. In this case, given Q, the foreign contribution to
labor supply is minimum and total labor supply is inelastic. At low levels of the wage, only
skilled immigrants find it profitable to enter the domestic labor market and the proportion
of skilled immigrants is equal to 1. Foreign contribution is maximum and labor supply
is again inelastic. For intermediate levels between W 0u and W 00u , the percentage of skilled
immigrants in the total inflow is decreasing with the wage and so is labor supply. This
result is crucially dependent on the assumption of a higher migration rate for the skilled,
due to higher costs of mobility for the unskilled.
Having discussed the properties of labor supply, we are ready to characterize the equi-
librium with immigration. The formal statement will require an additional definition.
Thus, let us define the maximum inflow of immigrants compatible with the labor market
equilibrium as8:
M ≡
n
T
£
(1− η) /W 0s
¤ 1
η − [εsπ + εu(1− π)]N
o
/ [zεu∗ + (1− z)εs∗]
Then, we can write:
Proposition 2 In a competitive equilibrium with immigration, either:
(i) M = Q < M
(ii) W > W 0s, eπ∗t ∈ [π∗, 1], θst > 0, θut ≥ 0
8For our purposes, the only interesting case is where M > 0, which is equivalent to assume that in the
closed economy case, W >W 0s .
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or
(i) M =M ≤ Q
(ii) W =W 0s, eπ∗t = 1, θst = θut = 0
Proof. WhenQ < M,M < M andW > W 0s. By definition ofW 0s, we have eπ∗ ∈ [π∗, 1].
If Q ≥ M , labor market equilibrium implies M = M. Thus, W = W 0s so that θs = 0 andeπ∗ = 1.
As the proposition shows, there are two possible equilibrium types. In the former, the
immigration quota is binding and labor market clears with Q foreign workers, of which a
fraction eπ∗ ∈ [π∗, 1] is skilled. At this equilibriumW > W 0s. In the latter, the immigration
quota is high (and possibly not binding) and the labor market clears with the maximum
number of immigrants M . The unit wage rate is at the minimum level W 0s compatible
with immigration and only skilled workers enter the domestic economy.9
2.3 Policy implications
In our context, it is interesting to consider what would be the optimal immigration policy
for a government whose objective were to maximize the income (and consequently the
welfare) of domestic citizens.
To discuss this issue, let us assume that a given quota Q is currently in place. If the
government restricts immigration further, by setting Q0 > Q, it would increase the level
of domestic wages, both for the skilled and the unskilled. However, it would also bring
about a decrease in the percentage of skilled workers among immigrants. Thus, total labor
supply decreases and so does aggregate income and consumption.
Therefore, we can state the following result:
Proposition 3 National income is maximized if and only if Q ≥M.
9A non-increasing labor supply implies that the equilibrium wage may not be unique. A suﬃcient
condition for uniqueness is that labor supply is steeper than labor demand between W 0u and W 00u . We
restrict the analysis to this case as the presence of multiple equilibria would not change the main qualitative
results of the model.
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Proof. National income can be written as:
NI = T η (L+ L∗)1−η − (1− η)T η (L+ L∗)−η L∗ (13)
Note that NI is increasing with L∗ and the latter is maximized when Q ≥M .
Clearly, the maximization of national income entails possible redistributive conflicts
as long as for domestic agents labor income is reduced while land income is increased. If
land were unequally distributed, the immigration policy that we have just described may
not be Pareto improving.
3 The dynamic model
Skilled workers migration is likely to determine positive long-run eﬀects in the receiving
economy, for instance by stimulating knowledge accumulation10 or by contributing to
human capital formation. The overall growth eﬀect of immigration could be negative,
however, if immigrants are less educated than natives on average.11 This may happen
because the foreign educational attainment is low relative to the domestic level ( εs∗ < εs,
εu∗ < εu) and/or because the percentage of unskilled agents is higher among immigrants
than among natives (eπ∗ < π). In presence of negative growth eﬀects, the impact of
immigration on natives welfare may also be negative.
As we have seen in the previous section, when migration entails larger direct costs for
the unskilled, the selection of immigrants will be more favorable the larger the inflow of
immigrants. The level of the immigration quota may therefore play an important role in
determining the long-run eﬀects of immigration.
10See Lundborg and Segerstrom [10].
11Most growth models with immigration (see e.g. chapter 9 in Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1]) assume
that the human capital of immigrants is low on average relative to natives. This assumption is mainly
motivated by the US experience, as the percentage of individuals with low education attainment is much
higher among immigrants into the US than among natives. However, this is not the case in other major
destination countries, such as Canada for example. Moreover, immigrants are generally more concentrated
than natives at very high levels of education attainment. This is also true in the US, as reported by Hanson
et alia [9].
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To explore this issue, in this section we study a dynamic extension of our model, where
the distribution of skills among the native labor force πt is determined by previous private
education decisions.
3.1 The closed economy case
We first set up the dynamic model in the closed economy case (Q = 0) and then consider
the possibility of international migration (Q > 0).
We consider an OLG framework with a constant mass N of households, each composed
by a grand-parent (old retiree), a parent (adult worker) and a child. All agents are
born with some level of innate ability ai which determines their attitude to learn and is
stochastically generated by a random process. We assume that there is no correlation
between a parent’s and his oﬀspring’s ability and between the latter and the parent’s
skill (education) level, that is the random variable ai is identically and independently
distributed over the interval [a, a] in each generation and class. The distribution function
of ability is uniform.
Children who attend school become high-productivity workers in adulthood. Children
who do not attend school become low-productivity workers in adulthood. The individual
cost of acquiring education is denoted with eit and is proportional to the skilled hourly
wage wst by a factor 0 < µit < 1 which depends inversely on the child’s innate ability ai
and on a measure of the average level of human capital λt. In particular, we assume:
eit = µitwst = (1− ai − bλt)wst (14)
where b > 0 and:
λt ≡ (εs − εu)πt + εu (15)
To ensure 0 < µit < 1 we impose 0 < a and a < 1 + b.
We assume that there are no capital markets, so that altruistic parents allocate wage
income It (which depends on skill level) between consumption (including that of their
children) and education expenditure, by deciding whether or not to send their children to
school.
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Land belongs to the old, who use rental income to finance consumption. In the absence
of voluntary transfers, land property is passed from one generation to the next in the form
of (involuntary) bequest.
The utility function of an agent born at time t− 1 takes the form:
U = α ln ct + β ln dt+1 + γ ln It+1 (16)
where α, β, γ ∈ (0, 1), ct denotes adult-age consumption and dt+1 denotes old-age con-
sumption. Altruism takes a “warm glow” form, such that parents positively value their
children’s income in adulthood It+1.
The budget constraints faced by this agent are:
It = ct + eit (17)
dt+1 = pt+1(T/N) (18)
3.2 Schooling decisions and the dynamics of natives’ human capital
The only economic decision that household members need to take is for adults to decide
whether or not to send their children to school. Such decision is taken by parents after
observing children’s ability.
At time t, a skilled worker will send her child to school if and only she has a level of
ability at least equal to ast = as(πt) ∈ (a, a), where as(πt) is defined by:
−α ln(ast + bλt) = γ ln (εs/εu) (19)
Similarly, an unskilled worker will send her child to school if and only if she has a level of
ability at least equal to aut = au(πt) ∈ (a, a), where au(πt), is defined by:
−α ln[1− (εs/εu) (1− au − bλt)] = γ ln(εs/εu) (20)
By observation of equations (19) and (20) and taking into account that 0 < µit < 1 we can
conclude that ast < aut ∀t.12
12To ensure interior solutions for ast and aut , we will assume that −α ln(a + bεs) <
γ ln(εs/εu) and −α ln[1− (εs/εu) (1− a+ bεu)] > γ ln(εs/εu).
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At time t, a fraction 1 − F [as(πt)] of the children born from skilled parents and a
fraction 1 − F [au(πt)] of the children born from unskilled parents are sent to school. In
equilibrium, the proportion of skilled workers at time t+ 1 is thus given by:
πt+1 = Π(πt) = πt {1− F [as(πt)]}+ (1− πt) {1− F [au(πt)]}
which simplifies to:
πt+1 = Π(πt) =
1
a− a(Γπt +∆+ bλt) (21)
where Γ = au−as = (εs/εu)−(γ+α)/α+εs−εuεs −(εs/εu)
−(γ/α) > 0 and∆ = a−(εs/εu)−(γ+α)/α−
εs−εu
εs > 0.
We are now ready to establish the following result:
Proposition 4 In the closed economy, the fraction of skilled native workers πt converges
to a globally stable steady state πc defined by:
πc =
a− au(πc)
a− a+ as(πc)− au(πc)
Proof. Note that Π(0) > 0, Π(1) < 1 and dπt+1
dπt
=
Γ+ b(εs − εu)
a− a > 0.
In the absence of immigration, the economy converges to a steady state characterized
by a constant fraction of skilled native workers πc and constant labor supply Lc.
3.3 The dynamics with immigration
We now extend the analysis to investigate the dynamic eﬀects of immigration. For sim-
plicity, we restrict attention to temporary migration. In particular, we assume that, in
each period, a mass Mt ≤ Q of adult workers is admitted into the country. Immigrants
are required to return home at the end of the period.
Even if temporary, immigration may have relevant long run eﬀects in our model. In
fact, if the average human capital of immigrants is high relative to natives, then immi-
gration of relatively skilled individuals will reduce the individual cost of education and
stimulate human capital formation among natives, by reducing the threshold levels of
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ability that make schooling the preferred option. On the contrary, if the average human
capital of immigrants is low relative to natives, immigration will reduce domestic average
human capital with negative spillover eﬀects on individual incentives for human capital
accumulation.
In each period, given the fraction of skilled natives πt (predetermined at time t), the
domestic average level of human capital λt depends on the number of immigrants Mt and
their selection eπ∗t . In particular, we have:
λt ≡
[(εs − εu)πt + εu]N + [(1− z) (εs∗ − εu∗) eπ∗t + εu∗]Mt
N +Mt
(22)
As in the static case, eπ∗t and Mt are determined in equilibrium along with the unit
wage Wt = W (Lt). The immigration quota Q will be binding whenever it is lower than
the maximum inflow of immigrants compatible with equilibrium on the labor market M t.
The dynamics of natives human capital with international migration is then determined
by equation (21). Notice that dΠ/dπt = Γ+b(dλt/dπt) is certainly positive for Q < M t.13
Let us now consider the dynamic eﬀects of a liberalization of labor flows (setting
Q > 0). We will denote with T the time of liberalization and assume that at T the
economy starts from the closed economy steady-state position (that is, πT = πc).
At the opening of borders, domestic labor supply increases (LT > Lc), due to the
inflow of immigrants, and the unit wage jumps down (WT < W c). Domestic average
human capital λT will decrease (increase) relative to the closed economy steady-state level
λc if and only if the average human capital of immigrants is low (high) relative to natives,
that is if and only if:
eπ∗T < (>)πc(εs − εu) + (εu − εu∗)(1− z)(εs∗ − εu∗) ≡ π∗T
13To ensure monotonicity, we will assume that this derivative is positive also for Q ≥Mt. In fact, when
the immigration quota is not binding, the number of immigrants decreases with πt. In this case, it could
happen that dλt/dπt < 0 if the (indirect) negative eﬀect of a decreasing number of immigrants dominates.
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The dynamic evolution of the economy after T depends crucially on the equilibrium
value of eπ∗T , which is determined by the level of the quota Q, given πc.
To state our main regarding the dynamics of the model with immigration, we need one
additional definition. Thus, let us define the wage level which is required for λT = λcas
follows:
W ≡ w
s∗ + P s − (wu∗ + Pu)A
(1− z)εs∗ − (A− z)εu∗
where A ≡ π∗T (1− π∗)/π∗(1− π∗T ).14 We can then write the following:
Proposition 5 If and only if Q < L
d(W )−Lc
[π∗T [(1−z)εs∗+zεu∗]+(1−π∗T )εu∗]
, the fraction of skilled na-
tives converges to a steady-state level which is lower than the steady-state level in the closed
economy.
Proof. Consider equation 8. Setting eπ∗ = π∗T , it yields θs/θu = A. Consider now
equations 6 and 7. Substituting equation 7 into 6 and dividing by θu, we obtain θs/θu =
z + [zwu∗ + zPu + (1 − z)Wεs∗ − ws∗ − P s]/θu. Thus, for eπ∗T = π∗T we must have θu =
[zwu∗ + zPu + (1 − z)Wεs∗ − ws∗ − P s]/(A − z). Taking again into account equation 7,
we get W = w
s∗+P s−(wu∗+Pu)A
(1−z)εs∗−(A−z)εu∗ ≡W. This is the level of wage that ensures that eπ∗T = π∗T .
To find the level of the quota that triggers this level of wage, we must solve the following
equation (which represents the equation of the labor market equilibrium at time T ):
{[εsπc + εu(1 − πc)]N + [π∗T [(1− z)εs∗ + zεu∗] + (1− π∗T )εu∗]Q} = [W/(1 − η)T η]−
1
η
which yields Q = L
d(W )−Lc
[π∗T [(1−z)εs∗+zεu∗]+(1−π∗T )εu∗]
where Ld(W ) ≡ [W/(1− η)T η]−
1
η .
⇒ If Q < L
d(W )−Lc
[π∗T [(1−z)εs∗+zεu∗]+(1−π∗T )εu∗]
⇒ WT > W ⇒ eπ∗T < π∗T . Thus, λT < λc and
πT+1 < πT .To clear the labor market at T + 1, given Q, we must have WT+1 > WT ⇒eπ∗T+1 < eπ∗T . Then, λT+1 < λT ⇒ πT+2 < πT+1 and so on. Recalling that by equation 21
Π(0) > 0 and Π(1) < 1, the dynamic path converges to a positive π < πc and eπ∗ ∈ [π∗, π∗T ).
⇐ If Q ≥ L
d(W )−Lc
[π∗T [(1−z)εs∗+zεu∗]+(1−π∗T )εu∗]
⇒ WT ≤ W ⇒ eπ∗T ≥ π∗T . To clear the labor
market at T +1, given Q, we must have WT+1 ≤WT ⇒ eπ∗T+1 ≥ eπ∗T . Then, λT+1 ≥ λT ⇒
14Our assumption that W 0s < W
0
u implies that π∗T > π∗ and W > 0. To make our analysis interesting,
we assume that π∗T < 1.
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πT+2 ≥ πT+1 and so on. As we assumed that dΠ/dπt > 0 even when Q ≥ M t, we can
conclude that the economy converges to a π ≥ πc and eπ∗ ∈ [π∗T , 1).
With international migration there are two possible steady states. In the first one,
the steady-state fraction of skilled natives is lower than in the closed economy. The path
toward the long-run equilibrium is characterized by decreasing πt and eπ∗t . The wage rate
jumps down at the time of liberalization of labor flows and increases in each subsequent
period. The overall eﬀect on the steady-state level of unit wage is ambiguous. On the
one hand, the decrease in the fraction of skilled natives shifts labor supply to the left and
consequently increase the wage rate relative to the closed economy. On the other hand,
independently from their skills, the entry of foreign workers shifts labor supply to the
right, thereby pushing the wage rate up.
In the second equilibrium, the steady-state fraction of skilled natives is higher than in
the closed economy. The path toward this equilibrium is characterized by increasing πt andeπ∗t . The wage rate jumps down at the time of liberalization of labor flows and decreases in
each subsequent period. The steady-state unit wage is lower than in the closed economy.
Whether the economy ends up in the first or in the second type of equilibrium depends
on the level of the immigration quota which in turn aﬀects the average human capital λ
right after the opening of borders.
When the quota is low, the wage rate after liberalization is high and the quality of
immigrants is low. Thus, the initial eﬀect on λ will be negative, the next period proportion
of skilled national workers will be lower and the wage rate higher, further reducing the
proportion of skilled immigrants. In turn this will decrease λ and so on. If the quota is
suﬃciently high, the eﬀect on λ is positive, the opposite will happen and the equilibrium
will be of the second type.
3.4 Policy implications
As we know, immigration increases welfare in the short run, as labor supply and national
income increase due to the intial inflow of immigrants. However, if the immigration policy
is too restrictive, human capital accumulation is reduced in the host country. The implied
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reduction in labor supply by natives may outweigh the positive eﬀect of immigration on
aggregate labor supply with negative long-run eﬀects on the welfare of natives.
More specifically, when Q < L
d(W )−Lc
[π∗T [(1−z)εs∗+zεu∗]+(1−π∗T )εu∗]
and the wage rate reaches a
level higher thanW c, immigration lowers national income in the long-run. In this case, the
steady-state equilibrium of the closed economy is Pareto superior (given an appropriate
redistribution) relative to the equilibrium with immigration.
However, as the last proposition suggests, the trade-oﬀ between short-run and long-run
welfare consequences can be avoided by setting Q > Ld(W ) − Lc. In this case, national
income increases in the long run with immigration. We can strengthen this result by
showing that there exists a level of the quota such that in the open economy welfare is
maximized in each period. In particular, we can write:
Proposition 6 National income is maximized in each period if and only if Q ≥MT
Proof. As M t ≤ MT ∀t ≥ T, Wt = W
0
s ∀t ⇒ eπ∗t = 1 and Mt = M t ∀t. Thus,
∀t ≥ T , λt is maximized; hence πt is also maximized and so is aggregate labor supply. By
equation (13) national income is also maximized
SettingQ ≥MT drives the wage down to the levelW
0
s in each period. Thus, only skilled
immigrants enter and, at each point in time, their number is the maximum compatible
with the equilibrium on the labor market.
4 Conclusions
In this work we provided a formal investigation of the economic consequences of interna-
tional migration from the point of view of destination countries, assuming that migration
costs are higher for the less-educated. Consistently with international evidence on mi-
gration flows, this implies that the migration rate is higher among the highly-educated.
In this framework, we showed that there exists a negative relation between the domes-
tic wage level and the percentage of educated workers among immigrants in equilibrium,
yielding interesting policy implications regarding the eﬀects of quantitative restrictions on
immigration on natives’ welfare and human capital accumulation.
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In particular, we showed that the optimal immigration policy from the point of view
of natives requires an immigration quota above a certain minimum level. This policy
drives down the domestic wage and results in high labor demand and positive selection
of immigrants. In turn, this determines a substantial brain gain through the inflow of
highly-educated individuals with positive consequences on national income and welfare
and significant dynamic eﬀects in terms of higher human capital accumulation among
natives.
Our analysis may be extended along several dimensions. On the one hand, dropping
perfect substitutability of skilled and unskilled labor in production, we may study the
influence of migration on the skill premium and on the return to investment in education.
Another fruitful extension may explore the political economy of migration in a dynamic
perspective. We leave these extensions for our future research.
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